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Abstract
We initiate the study of indivisible chore alloca-
tion for agents with asymmetric shares. The fair-
ness concept we focus on is the weighted natu-
ral generalization of maxmin share: WMMS fair-
ness and OWMMS fairness. We first highlight
the fact that commonly-used algorithms that work
well for the allocation of goods to asymmetric
agents, and even for chores to symmetric agents do
not provide good approximations for allocation of
chores to asymmetric agents under WMMS. As a
consequence, we present a novel polynomial-time
constant-approximation algorithm, via linear pro-
gram, for OWMMS. For two special cases: the bi-
nary valuation case and the 2-agent case, we pro-
vide exact or better constant-approximation algo-
rithms.
1 Introduction
We consider fair allocation of indivisible chores when agents
have asymmetric shares. In contrast to the case of goods
for which agents have positive value, chores are disliked by
agents and they have negative values for them. The fairness
concept we focus on is the maxmin share (MMS) fairness
which was designed for allocation of indivisible items. MMS
is based on the thought experiment that if the items are par-
titioned into bundles and an agent would always get the least
preferred bundle of items, what is the best way she can par-
tition the items. The value of such a bundle is the maxmin
share of the agent. An allocation is deemed MMS fair if each
agent gets her required share.
Maxmin share fairness was proposed by [Budish, 2011]
as a fairness concept for allocation of indivisible items.
It is a relaxation of proportionality fairness that requires
each of the n agents should get a value that is at least
1/n of the total value she has for the set of all items.
When items are divisible, maxmin share fairness coin-
cides with proportionality. Maxmin share fairness is a
weaker concept when items are indivisible. It was con-
jectured that a maxmin fair allocation always exists but
[Procaccia and Wang, 2014] identified a counter-example.
Since the work of [Procaccia and Wang, 2014], there are sev-
eral papers on algorithms that find an approximateMMS allo-
cation [Amanatidis et al., 2015; Barman and Murthy, 2017;
Ghodsi et al., 2018; Aziz et al., 2017]. All these works make
a typical assumption that agents are symmetric and should be
treated in a similar manner.
[Farhadi et al., 2017] were the first to consider MMS fair-
ness for the case where indivisible goods are allocated and
the agents are not symmetric because they may have differ-
ent entitlement share of the goods. Ideally, an agent would
expect to get a share of the total value that is proportional
to her entitlement. However, when items are indivisible,
MMS fairness needs to be suitably generalized to the cater
for asymmetric entitlement shares. Farhadi et al. general-
ized MMS fairness to that of the more general MMS con-
cept as weighted MMS (WMMS) that caters for entitlements.
They devised a simple ordinal (that only used the qualita-
tive ranking information of items) algorithm that ensures an
n-approximation guarantee for WMMS where each agent’s
allocation is at least 1/n of her value in a WMMS allo-
cation. Beyond the results for goods [Farhadi et al., 2017;
Farhadi et al., 2019], not much is known about chore alloca-
tion when the agents are asymmetric despite the recent active
research in fair allocation of goods and chores. Furthermore,
it is not clear whether the results for goods from one setting
could carry over the other [Aziz, 2016].
In this paper, we focus on the fair allocation of chores
rather than goods for asymmetric agents. In the case of
chores, agents do not have entitlements but relative shares.
If an agent has a higher share, she is expected to take a higher
load of the chores. Treating agents asymmetrically may be a
requirement for several reasons. For example, countries with
a larger population and CO2 emission may be liable to under-
take more responsibility to clean up the environment. In this
paper, the central research question we examine is the follow-
ing one. When indivisible chores are to be allocated among
agents with asymmetric shares, for what approximation fac-
tor do approximately WMMS fair allocations exist and how
efficiently can they be computed?
Contributions
We consider a model of allocation of chores in which agents
have relative shares as compared to entitlements. Differ-
ent to the case of symmetric agents, we first prove that
even with only two agents, no algorithm can simultane-
ously guarantee each agent’s value to be higher than 43 of
her weighted maxmin share. Moreover, we show that many
greedy algorithms widely used in the literature, including
[Farhadi et al., 2017] and [Aziz et al., 2017], may have arbi-
trarily bad performance.
Then we design a polynomial-time algorithm which pro-
vides a 4-approximation to the minimal relaxation of WMMS
value (OWMMS) under which aWMMS allocation exists. To
present this algorithm, we first study a special case when all
agents have an identical valuation. The algorithm combines
(1) the use of a greedy algorithm for the case of identical val-
uations and (2) linear programming and rounding techniques.
Finally, we study two restricted cases: a two-agent setting
and a binary valuation setting. For the two-agent case, we
present a variant of divide-and-chooseprotocolwhich ensures
each agent’s value is at least 32 of her weighted maxmin share;
For binary valuations, we show that a WMMS allocation ex-
ists and can be efficiently computed. For asymmetric agents
and indivisible items, this is the first algorithmic result for
binary valuations.
2 Related Work
The fair allocation problem has been extensively studied
in the cake cutting literature [Dubins and Spanier, 1961;
Stromquist, 1980; Alon, 1987; Brams and Taylor, 1995;
Brams and Taylor, 1996; Robertson and Webb, 1998;
Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016]. In this line of work, researchers
study how to fairly allocate a divisible item (e.g., cake)
among a number of agents. Solution concepts such as
envy-freeness and proportionality are prominent criteria for
fairness. In the context of divisible goods, researchers have
extended results for the case of equal entitlements to those of
unequal entitlements (see e.g., [Cseh and Fleiner, 2018]).
As for MMS fairness, it is already known that even for ad-
ditive valuations, there exists an instance such that no alloca-
tion can simultaneously guarantee each agent receives at least
her MMS [Kurokawa et al., 2018]. But approximate MMS
can be efficiently computed; see [Barman and Murthy, 2017;
Ghodsi et al., 2018; Kurokawa et al., 2018]. Computing
WMMS shares is an NP-hard problem for both goods and
for chores even for the case of 2 agents and for equal shares.
The statement can be derived via a reduction from the integer
partition problem [Garey and Johnson, 1979].
Most of the work on fair allocation of items is for
the case of goods although recently, fair allocation of
chores [Aziz et al., 2017] or combinations of goods and
chores [Aziz et al., 2018] has received attention as well. It
is shown by [Aziz et al., 2017] that MMS allocations for
chores do not always exist but can be 2-approximated by a
simple round-robin algorithm. [Aziz et al., 2017] also pre-
sented a PTAS for relaxation of MMS called optimal MMS.
[Barman and Murthy, 2017] presented an improved approxi-
mation algorithm for MMS allocation of chores. Fair alloca-
tion of indivisible goods and asymmetric agents has also been
studied [Farhadi et al., 2017; Farhadi et al., 2019]. We take
a similar approach and study the chore allocation problem
when the agents are not symmetric. [Babaioff et al., 2017]
considered the allocation of indivisible goods where agents
have different entitlements. One of the concepts that they pro-
pose is called ℓ-out-of-d MMS that can also apply to agents
having ordinal preferences over bundles of chores. However,
the paper focusses on results for goods.
3 Preliminaries
We begin by presenting our setting formally and discussing
fairness concepts as well as some basic notations in the paper.
3.1 Setting
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a set of n agents, and M =
{1, 2, · · · ,m} be a set of m indivisible items. In this work,
we always use i ∈ N and j ∈ M to indicate an agent
and an item, separately. Each agent has a valuation func-
tion Vi : 2
M → R. Denote by Vij = Vi({j}). We as-
sume that items are chores to every agent, i.e., Vij ≤ 0 for all
j ∈ M and the valuations are additive, i.e., for any S ⊆ M ,
Vi(S) =
∑
j∈S Vij . Without loss of generality and just for
ease of presentation, throughout this paper except Section 6.2,
it is assumed that all of the valuations are normalized, i.e.
Vi(∅) = 0 and Vi(M) = −1.
In this work, we consider the case when agents are asym-
metric. Particularly, every agent has a share for the chores,
namely si ∈ (0, 1]. The shares add up to 1, i.e.,
∑
i∈N si = 1.
Letting V = (V1, · · · , Vn) and s = (s1, · · · , sn), we use
I = (N,M, s,V ) to denote a chore allocation instance and
I = (N,M, s, V ) when all agents have the identical valua-
tion V . Note that when all agents have identical valuation V ,
V ({j}) is simplified as V j for any j ∈M . Let Π(M) be the
set of all n-partitions of the items. A generic allocation will
be denoted by X = 〈X1, . . . , Xn〉 whereXi is the bundle of
agent i.
3.2 WMMS Fairness
Before presenting theWMMS fairness concept that takes into
account the shares of the agents, we first present the standard
MMS fairness concept that assumes the shares of the agents
are equal. For symmetric agents, the classical maxmin share
(MMS) of an agent i with valuation Vi is defined as
MMSi = max
〈Xi〉i∈N∈Π(M)
min
j∈N
Vi(Xj).
Intuitively, when allocating items to n agents, each agent
should get an allocation with a value that is 1/n of the to-
tal value they have for all the items. Since the items are not
divisible, this proportionality requirement may be not achiev-
able for the agents. In view of this,MMSi can be viewed as a
relaxed lower bound on the value that agent i hopes for if she
has the chance to partition the items into n bundles and ev-
ery other agent adversarially chooses a bundle before i. Next,
we generalize the classical MMS notion to the setting with
asymmetric agents.
Definition 1 (Weighted MMS) Given any chore allocation
instance I = (N,M, s,V ), for every agent i ∈ N , the
weighted maxmin share (WMMS) value of i is defined as:
WMMSi(I) = max
〈Xi〉i∈N∈Π(M)
min
j∈N
Vi(Xj)
si
sj
.
Any partition achievesWMMSi(I) is called a P-i partition.
When the instance I is clear from the context, we may use
WMMSi for short. The definition above for WMMS fair-
ness is exactly the same as that of WMMS as formalized by
[Farhadi et al., 2017] for the case of goods except that the en-
titlement ei of an agent i is replaced by her share si. As
mentioned in the introduction, whereas a higher entitlement
for goods is desirable for an agent, a higher share for chores
is undesirable for the agent.
We call an allocation WMMS if the value of the allocation
to each agent i is worth at least WMMSi to her. Similarly,
an allocation is called α-WMMS, if the total value of items
allocated to each agent i is at least αWMMSi for α ≥ 1.
Note that when all shares are equal, WMMS coincides
with MMS fairness so it is a proper generalization of
MMS. Secondly, we spell out an insight that also provides
justification for the WMMS concept that was defined by
[Farhadi et al., 2017]. We note that when the items are divis-
ible, then WMMSi = siVi(M). Hence, for divisible chores,
WMMS fairness also implies a natural generalization of pro-
portionality that takes into account the shares of agents. We
call the latter requirement as weighted proportionality.
In the following, we define some more notation that will
be used in the paper. Given a chore allocation instance
I = (N,M, s,V ), for any agent i and any partition X =
〈Xi〉i∈N , let WIi (X) = mink∈N
Vi(Xk)
sk
. That is, WIi (X)
is the unfairness degree of allocation X to i. Let Wi(I) =
max〈X1,...,Xn〉∈Π(M)W
I
i (X). Thus Wi(I) is the smallest
degree of unfairness andWMMSi(I) = siWi(I). Moreover,
we have the following simple properties.
Lemma 1 Given any instance I = (N,M, s,V ), for any
i ∈ N ,Wi(I) ≤ −1, andWMMSi(I) ≤ −si.
Proof: Note that for any agent i and any allocation 〈Xi〉i∈N ,∑
k∈N
Vi(Xk)
sk
· sk =
∑
k∈N Vi(Xk) = −1, which is the
weighted arithmetic mean of the terms
Vi(Xk)
sk
, with weights
sk (whose sum is 1). As the mean equals −1, the smallest
must be at most−1 andWi(I) = mink∈N
Vi(Xk)
sk
≤ −1. 
Next we show a simple algorithm, Naive, which returns an
n-WMMS allocation. Algorithm Naive produces an alloca-
tion that allocates all of the items to a single agent who has
the highest share (ties are broken arbitrarily).
Lemma 2 Let I = (N,M, s,V ) be any chore allocation
instance and 〈Xi〉i∈N be the output of AlgorithmNaive. Then
Vi(Xi) ≥ nWMMSi(I) for any i ∈ N .
Proof: Let i∗ be the agent who has the largest share, thus
si∗ ≥
1
n
. It is easy to see that for any agent i 6= i∗, Vi(Xi) =
0, which is trivially at least as large as nWMMSi(I). By
Lemma 1, WMMSi∗(I) ≤ −si∗ ≤ −
1
n
. Accordingly,
Vi∗(M) ≥ nWMMSi∗(I). 
We present the following example to provide additional in-
tuition of WMMS and our notation.
Chores
Agent Share 1 2 3 4
1 14 −
1
4 −
1
4 −
1
4 −
1
4
2 34 −
3
8 −
3
8 −
1
8 −
1
8
Table 1: An Example of a Chore Allocation Setting.
Example Let I = (N,M, s,V ) be a chore allocation in-
stance, where N = {1, 2},M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the agents’
shares and valuations are shown in Table 1.
In this instance, for agent 1, allocating one of the four
chores to herself and the remaining three chores to agent
2 is an exact weighted proportional allocation with respect
to valuation V1. Then W1(I) = −1, F1(I) = 1 and
WMMS1(I) = −
1
4 .
Similarly, for agent 2, allocating chores {1, 2} to agent 2
and chores {3, 4} to agent 1 is an exact weighted proportional
allocation with respect to valuation V2. Thus W2(I) = −1,
F2(I) = 1 and WMMS2(I) = −
3
4 . Note that this allocation
is bad for agent 1 since V1({3, 4}) = −
1
2 < WMMS1(I).
However, one of the weighted proportional allocations to
agent 1, e.g., X1 = {1} and X2 = {2, 3, 4}, satisfies both
of WMMS1(I) and WMMS2(I), since V1(X1) = −
1
4 ≥
WMMS1(I) and V2(X2) = −
5
8 ≥ WMMS2(I). Therefore,
〈X1, X2〉 is a WMMS allocation.
4 Optimal WMMS Fairness
It is well known that for symmetric agents, no matter the
items are goods or chores, an MMS allocation always exists
for the 2-agent case. But for asymmetric agents, we note that
an exactWMMS allocation may not exist even when there are
only two agents. Indeed, by the following lemma, we see that
the lower bound of the problem is at least 43 , which means that
there is no allocation that can guarantee each agent’s value to
be greater than 43WMMSi(I) for every i ∈ N .
Lemma 3 In the chore allocation problem, any algorithm
has an approximation ratio of at least 43 for WMMS fairness.
Proof: In the following we construct an instance I =
(N,M, s,V ) with N = {1, 2}, M = {1, 2} and the shares
and valuations are shown in Table 2.
Items
Agent Share 1 2
1 34 −
3
4 −
1
4
2 14 −
1
2 −
1
2
Table 2: Instance to establish the 4
3
lower bound for 2 agents.
We first note that for agent 1, the unique P-1 partition
is X = 〈X1, X2〉 with X1 = {1} and X2 = {2}, since
W I1 (X) = min
{
− 34
3
4
,
− 14
1
4
}
= −1, which is the largest
among all possible allocations. Accordingly,WMMS1(I) =
3
4 × (−1) = −
3
4 . For agent 2, to maximize W
I
2 , the
only way is to set X ′ = 〈X ′1, X
′
2〉 with X
′
1 = {1, 2} and
X ′2 = ∅, since W
I
2 (X
′) = min
{
−1
3
4
,
0
1
4
}
= − 43 , which
is the largest among all possible allocations. Accordingly,
WMMS2(I) =
1
4 × (−
4
3 ) = −
1
3 .
However, X is bad to agent 2, since V2(X2) = −
1
2 <
WMMS2(I) and X ′ is bad to agent 1, since V1(X ′1) =
−1 < WMMS1(I). Therefore the best tradeoff to satisfy
the two agents simultaneously would be allocation X ′, since
V2(X2) =
3
2WMMS2(I) and V1(X
′
1) =
4
3WMMS1(I). In-
deed, we need to take all possible allocations into considera-
tion, but it is easy to see that all other allocations can only be
worse.
Thus, no algorithm could provide an allocation with each
agent i’s value being strictly larger than 43WMMSi(I), which
finishes the proof of Lemma 3. 
Accordingly, it is natural to consider a relaxed version of
WMMS, optimal WMMS (OWMMS) fairness, which is simi-
lar to the one introduced in [Aziz et al., 2017].
Definition 2 (Optimal WMMS) Let I = (N,M, s,V ) be a
chore allocation instance. The optimal WMMS (OWMMS)
ratio α∗ is defined as the minimal α ∈ [1,∞) for which
an α-WMMS allocation always exists. Let OWMMSi(I) =
α∗WMMSi for any i ∈ N . A partition X = 〈X1, . . . , Xn〉
is called an OWMMS allocation, if Vi(Xi) ≥ OWMMSi(I)
for all i ∈ N .
It is easy to see that WMMSi(I) ≥ OWMMSi(I) for
any instance I and any agent i. For any partition X =
〈X1, . . . , Xn〉, if Vi(Xi) ≥ c · OWMMSi(I) for all i ∈ N,
thenX is called c-approximation to the OWMMS allocation.
5 Approximation Algorithms
For the case of goods allocation, the greedy round robin al-
gorithm considered by [Farhadi et al., 2017] gives the best
guarantee (of n-approximation for goods). Interestingly, the
same algorithm was proved to provide a 2-approximation
for MMS allocation of chores when agents are symmetric
[Aziz et al., 2017]. However, when agents have different
shares, such an algorithm can be arbitrarily poor. We provide
a bad example in the appendix, where we also show that some
natural attempts to ‘fix’ the bad performance of the greedy al-
gorithm do not help.
In the following, we give our polynomial-time (4 + ǫ)-
approximation algorithm. That is, for any ǫ > 0, it returns
an allocation 〈Xi〉i∈N such that for any agent i, Vi(Xi) ≥
(4+ ǫ)OWMMSi. In order to present the main algorithm, we
first present a polynomial-time algorithm which guarantees
each agent i’s value to be at least 2WMMSi, when all of the
agents have an identical valuation.
5.1 Identical Valuation
When all agents have an identical valuation, we show the
algorithm, EgalGreedy defined in Algorithm 1, is a 2-
approximation to an exactWMMS allocation.
The next lemma relies on a connection to the parallel pro-
cessors scheduling problem. In this problem, there is a set of
Algorithm 1 EgalGreedy - An Algorithm for Identical Valu-
ations
Require: Chore allocation instance (N,M, s, V )
Ensure: Allocation X = 〈X1, . . . , Xn〉.
1: Initially,Xi = ∅ for all i ∈ N .
2: Order all chores from the lowest value to the highest value such
that V 1 ≤ V 2 ≤ · · · ≤ Vm.
3: for j = 1 tom do
4: i∗ ∈ argmax
i∈N
V (Xi ∪ {j})
si
;
5: Xi∗ = Xi∗ ∪ {j}.
6: return AllocationX .
jobs and a set of processors. Each job has to be processed
exactly once on exactly one processor. Processors may have
different speeds [Gonzalez et al., 1977; Friesen, 1987]. The
problem specifies the time required to process a given job on
a given machine. Typically, the goal of scheduling problems
is to find an assignment of the jobs such that the longest fin-
ishing time (i.e., makespan) is minimized. A detailed survey
of this line of work can be found in [Pinedo, 2016]. We prove
the following Lemma 4 in the appendix.
Lemma 4 For any chore allocation instance I =
(N,M, s, V ), where all agents have the identical val-
uation V , let 〈Xi〉i∈N be the allocation outputted by
EgalGreedy. We have V (Xi) ≥ 2WMMSi(I) for any i ∈ N .
One may suspect that a natural generalization of
EgalGreedy to the case that agents have different valuations
may work well. Unfortunately, in the appendix, we provide
an example that such an algorithm cannot have any constant
approximation ratio.
5.2 General Valuations
Now we are ready to study the general case when agents may
have different valuations. For any chore allocation instance
I = (N,M, s,V ), let variable α represent theWMMS ratio,
and variable xij ∈ {0, 1} represent whether agent i gets item
j. Let x = (xij)i∈N,j∈M . Then the problem of computing its
OWMMS ratio and an OWMMS allocation can be formalized
as the following integer program.
IP :
min α
s.t.


∑
j∈M Vijxij ≥ αWMMSi(I), ∀i ∈ N∑
i∈N xij = 1, ∀j ∈M
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M
α ≥ 1.
To solve IP , in what follows, we first prove a key tech-
nical lemma by using the rounding technique introduced by
[Lenstra et al., 1990], which gives us the tool to round a frac-
tional assignment to an integer assignment.
Lemma 5 Let (N,M, s,V ) be any chore allocation in-
stance, w = (w1, w2, · · · , wn) ∈ (R−)N , and t =
(t1, t2, · · · , tn) ∈ (R−)N . Denote by Mi = {j ∈ M |Vij ≥
ti} and Nj = {i ∈ N |j ∈ Mi}. If the following linear
program
P :


∑
j∈Mi
Vijxij ≥ wi, ∀i ∈ N∑
i∈Nj
xij = 1, ∀j ∈M
xij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈Mi
has a feasible solution, then any extreme point x˜ of this poly-
tope (defining the solution space) can be rounded to a feasible
solution x¯ of the integer program
P ′ :


∑
j∈Mi
Vijxij ≥ wi + ti, ∀i ∈ N∑
i∈Nj
xij = 1, ∀j ∈M
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ N, j ∈Mi.
Proof: Let x˜ be an extreme point of the polytope defined by
P . Then x˜ contains at most m + n nonzero variables due
to the number of constraints in P . We construct a bipartite
graph via x˜, G = (N,M,E), where N is the set of agents,
M is the set of chores and E = {(i, j)|x˜ij > 0, i ∈ N, j ∈
M}. Using the same argument with the proof of Theorem 1
in [Lenstra et al., 1990], we know that G is a pseudoforest,
i.e., each connected component of G is a tree or a tree plus
one additional edge.
Next, we round x˜ to x¯. In any connected component C of
G, whenever there is a chore j whose degree is 1, then it must
be that for some i, x˜ij = 1. Then set x¯ij = 1 and delete this
chore from C. Denote by C′ the remained graph. Note that
in C′, any remaining chore has a degree at least 2. Therefore
C′ must contain a matching which covers all chores, due to
the fact that C′ is a tree or a tree plus one additional edge.
According to this matching, if (i, j) is matched, set x¯ij = 1;
otherwise, set x¯ij to be 0.
Next, it suffices to verify that x¯ is a feasible solution of
P ′. For each chore j, x¯ assigns it to exactly one agent. Thus,∑
i∈Nj
x¯ij = 1 for any j ∈ M . For each agent i ∈ N , there
is at most 1 chore j such that x˜ij is increased to 1. Since
0 ≥ Vij ≥ ti,∑
j∈Mi
Vij x¯ij ≥
∑
j∈Mi
Vij x˜ij + ti ≥ wi + ti,
which completes the proof of Lemma 5. 
Note that, solving the optimal α for integer program IP
is equivalent to finding the minimum value of α such that
IP has a feasible integer solution x. However, P is not the
relaxation of IP since in P , there is not a variable xij for
which Vij < ti. Equivalently, we can add these variables
to P and set them to zero. In the following, we discuss the
relationship between the solutions of IP , P and P ′.
Recall that α∗ is the OWMMS ratio, which is also the op-
timal value of IP . Let
c∗ = min{c ∈ R+0 |P has a feasible solution with
ti = wi = cWMMSi(I) for all i ∈ N}.
Note that c∗ always exists as c = n is always feasible by
Algorithm Naive. Moreover, although P is not the relaxation
of IP , c∗ is still a lower bound of α∗.
Lemma 6 α∗ ≥ c∗.
Lemma 6 shows that to approximateα∗, it suffices to find a
feasible solution of IP whose value is a good approximation
to c∗. Next, we show that a feasible solution of P ′ is naturally
a feasible solution of IP .
Lemma 7 Let c ∈ R+0 . If x is a feasible solution of P
′ with
ti = wi = cWMMSi(I) for all i ∈ N , then (x, 2c) is a
feasible solution of IP .
Both Lemmas 6 and 7 are proved in the appendix. Before
we show our main algorithm, let us discuss the following in-
tuitive procedure. First, compute c∗ and its corresponding
fractional allocation x˜. Then use Lemma 5 to round x˜ to an
integer solution x¯. By Lemma 7, x¯ is also a feasible solu-
tion of IP . Let X = 〈Xi〉i∈N be the final allocation, where
Xi = {j ∈M |x¯ij = 1} for every i ∈ N . Thus,
Vi(Xi) ≥ 2c
∗WMMSi(I) ≥ 2α
∗WMMSi(I),
where the first inequality is by Lemma 5 and the second in-
equality is by Lemma 6. That is, X is a 2-approximation to
the optimalWMMS allocation.
However, there are two computational issues with respect
to the procedure above: (1) The computation of WMMSi(I)
may need exponential time1; (2) Even if we know all the
WMMSi(I)’s, there is a problem of computing c∗.
To resolve (1), we use Algorithm EgalGreedy to compute
an approximate value WMMS′i for each WMMSi(I), where
WMMS′i ≥ 2WMMSi(I). Then we replace all WMMSi(I)
byWMMS′i in above procedure.
To resolve (2), we use binary search to find a near optimal
value of c∗. Initially, we first use Algorithm Naive to get an
upper bound n of α and 1 is a trivial lower bound. Let δ > 0
be the desired precision. Denote by u and l the current upper
and lower bounds, respectively. Set c = u+l2 and wi = ti =
cWMMS′i, and check if P has a feasible solution. If P has a
feasible solution, reset u to be u+l2 ; Otherwise reset l =
u+l
2 .
Repeat this process until u− l ≤ δ.
We formally describe the algorithm described above as Al-
gorithm 2, denoted by LinPro.
Theorem 1 Given any chore allocation instance I =
(N,M, s,V ) with α∗ being its OWMMS ratio. For any
ǫ > 0, Algorithm LinPro runs in polynomial time (for any
number of agents) and returns an allocation 〈Xi〉i∈N such
that for any agent i, Vi(Xi) ≥ (4 + ǫ)OWMMSi(I).
Proof: By Lemma 7,X is a feasible solution of IP . At Step
12, as l ≤ c∗ ≤ u and u− l ≤ ǫ4 , we have u ≤ c
∗ + ǫ4 . Thus,
Vi(Xi) ≥2uWMMS
′
i ≥ 2(c
∗ +
ǫ
4
)WMMS′i
≥4(c∗ +
ǫ
4
)WMMSi(I) ≥ 4(α
∗ +
ǫ
4
)WMMSi(I)
≥(4 + ǫ)OWMMSi(I),
where the first inequality is by Lemma 5, the second inequal-
ity is by Lemma 4, and the last inequality is by Lemma 6.
1 The computation ofWMMSi is NP-hard, even when n = 2 and
s1 = s2 =
1
2
, via a reduction from the Integer Partition Problem.
Algorithm 2 LinPro - An Algorithm for General Valuations
Require: Chore allocation instance I = (N,M, s,V ) and ǫ > 0.
Ensure: Allocation X = 〈X1, . . . , Xn〉
1: Initially,Xi = ∅ for all i ∈ N .
2: For each i ∈ N , run Algorithm EgalGreedy on instance I and
obtain allocationXi = 〈Xi1, X
i
2, . . . , X
i
n〉.
3: SetWMMS′i = Vi(X
i
i ) for all i ∈ N .
4: Let u = n and l = 1. % n is the upper bound by Naive.
5: while u− l > ǫ
4
do
6: Set c = u+l
2
.
7: Check if P has a feasible solution by setting wi = ti =
cWMMS′i for all i ∈ N .
8: if P has a feasible solution then
9: Reset u = c.
10: else
11: Reset l = c.
12: Set wi = ti = uWMMS
′
i for all i ∈ N and compute an ex-
treme point x˜ of P .
13: Use Lemma 5 to round x˜ to x¯.
14: SetXi = {j ∈M |x¯ij = 1} for all i ∈ N .
15: return AllocationX .
As LinPro requires us to run EgalGreedy and solve at most
O(log(n
ǫ
)) numbers of (polynomial-sized) linear program,
LinPro runs in polynomial time. 
Note that the role of EgalGreedy in LinPro can be replaced
by other (polynomial-time) approximation algorithms (such
the PTAS in [Hochbaum and Shmoys, 1988]) and the approx-
imation ratio (Lemma 4) is improved accordingly.
6 Restricted Cases
In this section, we consider two important restricted cases:
(1) two agents and (2) all agents have binary valuations (in
which case agents have value 0 or -1 for each item).
6.1 WMMS for Two Agents
Given any instance I = (N,M, s,V ) with N = {1, 2}, we
prove that it is always possible to guarantee each agent i’s
value to be at least 32WMMSi(I). Thus, by Lemma 3, the
OWMMS ratio α∗ for the 2-agent case is within [ 43 ,
3
2 ].
Divide-and-choose algorithms are widely studied in the lit-
erature, especially for the case of two agents. Roughly speak-
ing, the algorithm starts by letting one of the agents divide the
whole items (either goods or chores) into two bundles, and the
other agent chooses one from the two bundles. Such an algo-
rithm gives an exact MMS allocation for symmetric agents
and a 2-WMMS allocation for asymmetric agents (the agent
with smaller entitlement divides and the other agent chooses)
when the items are goods. However, it is not hard to see that
generic divide-and-choose algorithms could be arbitrarily bad
when the items are chores.
In the following, we show that with some modification, a
divide-and-choose style algorithm, DivCho (defined in Algo-
rithm 3), works well and guarantees each agent i’s value to
be at least 32WMMSi. Without loss of generality, assume
s1 ≤ s2.
Theorem 2 Let I = (N,M, s,V ) with N = {1, 2}, and
X = 〈X1, X2〉 be the output of Algorithm DivCho on I.
Algorithm 3DivCho -An Algorithm for the 2-Agent Case
Require: Chore allocation instance I = (N,M, s,V ) with N =
{1, 2}.
Ensure: Allocation X = 〈X1, X2〉.
1: Initially, set Xi = ∅ for both i ∈ N .
2: If s1 ≤ 13 and s2 ≥
2
3
, set X1 = ∅ and X2 = M . Go to Step
5.
3: Let agent 2 partition M into A1 and A2 according to a P-2
partition with respect toWMMS2(I).
4: Let agent 1 select his favorite bundle from A1 and A2. Denote
by X1 the one chosen by agent 1 and by X2 the one left for
Agent 2.
5: X = 〈X1, X2〉.
6: return AllocationX .
Then, for any agent i ∈ N , Vi(Xi) ≥
3
2WMMSi(I) ≥
3
2OWMMSi(I).
Proof: If s1 ≤
1
3 and s2 ≥
2
3 , Algorithm DivCho allocates
all chores to agent 2. Thus V1(X1) = 0 and V2(X2) =
−1, where agent 1 is trivially satisfied as V1(X1) ≥
3
2WMMS1(I). By Lemma 1, we have WMMS2(I) ≤
−s2 ≤ −
2
3 . Accordingly, V2(X2) ≥
3
2WMMS2(I).
As we assume that s2 ≥ s1, our last case is to con-
sider 12 ≤ s2 ≤
2
3 . By the definition of WMMS2(I) =
s2 ·min{
V2(A1)
s1
, V2(A2)
s2
}, V2(A1) ≥ V2(A2) ≥WMMS2(I).
As a result, no matter which allocation agent 2 eventually re-
ceives after the divide-and-choose procedure, the value of the
allocation will always be at least as much as WMMS2. For
agent 1, since V (X1) + V (X2) = −1 by assumption and he
selects his favorite allocationX1, V1(X1) ≥ −
1
2 . By Lemma
1 and the fact that s1 >
1
3 , WMMS1(I) < −
1
3 . Therefore,
V1(X1) >
3
2WMMS1(I). 
6.2 Binary Valuations
In this section, we study the case with any number of agents,
but every agent’s valuation is binary: Vij ∈ {0,−1} for all
i ∈ N and j ∈ M . Note that, throughout this section, we do
not impose normalization for ease of exposition. As will be
clear later, for this case, we show that it is always possible to
guarantee each agent i’s value to be at leastWMMSi, i.e., the
optimalWMMS ratio for binary valuation case is exactly 1.
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8 Let I = (N,M, s, V ) be a chore allocation in-
stance where all agents have an identical valuation V . If V
is uniform, (i.e. V (S) = −|S| for any S ⊆ M ), an exact
WMMS allocation can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof: It suffices to show if V is uniform, Algorithm
EgalGreedy returns an exact WMMS allocation. Suppose
X = 〈Xi〉i∈N is the output of EgalGreedy with respect to
V . Recall W (X) = mink∈N
V (Xk)
sk
= mink∈N
−|Xk|
sk
.
Let S = {k ∈ N |−|Xk|
sk
= W (X)} be the set of indices
where the minimum is obtained. In the following we show
W = W (X). Note that S 6= ∅. If X is not an optimal parti-
tion, then there is a partitionX∗ such thatW (X∗) > W (X).
Thus, every k ∈ S, Xk has to contain a smaller num-
ber of chores compared with X∗k . Accordingly, for some
t ∈ N\S, Xt has to contain more chores than X∗t , i.e.,
V (X∗t ) ≤ −|Xt| − 1. If
−|Xt|−1
st
≤ W(X), W(X∗) can-
not be larger than W (X). Thus, −|Xt|−1
st
> W(X). But
this is a contradiction with the fact that EgalGreedy always
allocates greedily, (i.e., Step 4 of EgalGreedy), since the last
chore cannot be allocated toXk for k ∈ S instead ofXt. That
isW = W(X).
Therefore,
V (Xi)
si
≥ W(X) = W and V (Xi) ≥ siW =
WMMSi for any i ∈ N , which competes the proof. 
Thus, by allocating all chores for which some agent has
zero value to one such agent, we are left with only the chores
for which all agents have value -1. As the modified instance
if uniform, by Lemma 8, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 For any binary valuation case, a WMMS allo-
cation exists and can be found efficiently.
7 Conclusions
We initiated the study on chore allocation with asymmetric
agents. We show that many widely studied greedy algorithms
in the literature performs badly and even for the 2-agent case
an exact WMMS allocation may not exist. We then pre-
sented a constant approximation polynomial time algorithm
for OWMMS allocations, and several algorithmic results for
the case of identical utilities, binary utilities, and for 2 agents.
Finding a stronger lower bound for WMMS allocations for
any number of agents remains an open problem.
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A Some Commonly Used Greedy Algorithms
In this section, we first show that the greedy round robin al-
gorithm considered by [Farhadi et al., 2017] which gives the
best guarantee (of n-approximation for goods) can be arbi-
trarily poor for the case of chores. This is surprising because
the algorithm only uses ordinal preferences and higher enti-
tlements and higher shares correlate with more items in the
goods and chores setting respectively. We also show that
natural attempts to ‘fix’ the bad performance of the greedy
sequential algorithm does not help. Interestingly, the same
round-robin greedy algorithm was proved to provide a 2-
approximation for MMS allocation of chores when agents
have the same shares [Aziz et al., 2017].
A.1 Round Robin
We define the greedy algorithmRound-Robin as follows. The
algorithm is oblivious to the shares of the agents. It is based
on sequentially allocating items in a round robin manner.
Each agent gets turns in a round robin manner to select one
of her most preferred chores from all unselected chores.
Round-Robin: Specify an ordering of agents and let
agents come in a round robin manner in the spec-
ified order and pick an item that is most preferred
from the unallocated items. Stop when all the items
have been allocated.
Now we construct a bad instance. Let I = (N,M, s, V )
be a chore allocation instance with n agents and n2 items, and
si =
n
(n+1)n−i+1 for i ∈ N . All agents have identical valu-
ation V , defined as follows. Denote j ∈ M by j = kn + b,
where 0 ≤ k ≤ n and 0 ≤ b < n−1, and Vj = −
1
(n+1)n−k+1
.
That is every agent has value
−
1
(n+ 1)n
for any item in {1, · · · , n};
−
1
(n+ 1)n−1
for any item in {n+ 1, · · · , 2n};
...
−
1
n+ 1
for any item in {n2 − n+ 1, · · · , n2}.
Since
∑
i∈N si → 1 and V (M) =
∑
j∈M Vj → 1 as
n → ∞, the instance is well-defined. Note that it is easy to
see the weighted proportional allocation with respect to V is
to allocate all chores in {(i−1)n+1, · · · , in} to agent i ∈ N ,
where every agent’s absolute value equals to her share, thus
WMMSi(I) = si = −
n
(n+1)n−i+1 .
However, following the Round-Robin protocol, the items
selected by the agents is as follows: for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
during the kth round, each agent i will select one item from
{(k − 1)n + 1, · · · , kn}. That is all items are ‘uniformly’
distributed among all agents such that each agent has value
− 1
n
for his own bundle. Let us consider agent 1 who has the
smallest share withWMMS1(I) = −
n
(n+1)n . Since
1
n
n
(n+1)n
→∞,
the Round-Robin allocation to agent 1 is arbitrarily bad.
Thus, Round-Robin does not have any bounded approxima-
tion guarantee for the optimalWMMS allocation.
A.2 Multiplicative-Greedy Algorithm
Next we consider the following greedy algorithm to modify
the Round Robin algorithm. In contrast to Round-Robin, the
picking order of the agents changes dynamically.
Multiplicative-Greedy: Let each agent’s propor-
tionality value be Vi(M)si, which is exactly si if
we normalize all valuations. Initialize allocation
Xi to be empty for each i ∈ N . Consider the agent
i for whom Vi(Xi)/si is the minimum. In case of
ties, choose the agent with the largest si. If there is
still a tie, break tie lexicographically. Let the agent
i select her most preferred untaken item. Repeat
until all items are allocated.
Net we present a bad example to show that
Multiplicative-Greedy cannot provide a good guarantee
as well. We consider the following example shown in
Table 3. Thus agent 2 selects item 2 and then agent 1
selects item 1. This allocation is arbitrarily bad to agent 1 if
0 < ǫ < 1 is sufficiently small.
Chores
Agent Share 1 2
1 ǫ −1 + ǫ −ǫ
2 1− ǫ −1 + ǫ −ǫ
Table 3: Instance 1 on whichMultiplicative-Greedy performs badly.
On the other hand, if we modify Multiplicative-Greedy by
using the smallest share to break ties, the algorithm performs
poorly on following example in Table 4.
Chores
Agent Share 1 2 3 4
1 ǫ −ǫ+ ǫ2 −ǫ2 −ǫ −1 + 2ǫ
2 ǫ −ǫ+ ǫ2 −ǫ2 −ǫ −1 + 2ǫ
3 1− 2ǫ −ǫ+ ǫ2 −ǫ2 −ǫ −1 + 2ǫ
Table 4: Instance 2 on whichMultiplicative-Greedy performs badly.
Multiplicative-Greedy will run as follows: Agent 1 selects
item 2; Agent 2 selects item 1; Agent 3 selects item 3; At this
time,
V1(X1)
s1
= ǫ, V2(X2)
s2
= 1− ǫ and V3(X3)
s3
= ǫ1−2ǫ . Since
V1(X1)
s1
< V3(X3)
s3
< V2(X2)
s2
, agent 1 need to select item 4.
However, it is easy to see that WMMS1 = WMMS2 = −ǫ,
WMMS3 = −1 + 2ǫ, and there exists an WMMS allocation:
X ′1 = {1, 2}, X
′
2 = {3} and X
′
3 = {4}. Since for agent
1,
V1(X1)
WMMS1
= 1−2ǫ+ǫ
2
ǫ
→ ∞, the returned allocation X is
arbitrarily bad to agent 1.
A.3 Additive-Greedy Algorithm
We consider another sequential allocation greedy algorithm
that uses an additive criterion to decide which agent gets the
turn to pick an item. Just like the Multiplicative-Greedy,
the picking sequence of the agents is not pre-defined and it
changes according to the items that have been allocated.
Additive-Greedy: Initialize allocation Xi to be
empty for each i ∈ N . Consider the agent i for
whom si+Vi(Xi) is the maximum. In case of ties,
choose the agent with the largest si. If there is still
a tie, break tie lexicographically. Let the agent se-
lect the most preferred untaken item. Repeat until
all items are selected.
Chores
Agent Share 1 2 3 4, · · · ,m
1 ǫ −1 + ǫ 0 −ǫ 0
2 1− ǫ −ǫ+ ǫ2 −ǫ −ǫ2 −ǫ2
Table 5: Instance on which Additive-Greedy performs badly.
Next we show this algorithm also has a bad performance.
Consider the example shown in Table 5. By setting m and ǫ
such that
(−ǫ+ ǫ2) + (−ǫ) + (m− 2)(−ǫ2) = −1.
In the beginning, agent 2 has a larger share and she selects
her most preferred item, i.e. one from {3, · · · ,m} since all
of them are her favorite items. Note that agent 2 still has a
larger value with respect to criterion si + Vi(Xi), until all
{3, · · · ,m} have been selected by agent 2. At this time,
s2 + V2(X2) = (1 − ǫ) − (m − 2)ǫ2 = ǫ − ǫ2. Since
s1 − V1(X1) = ǫ > s2 + V2(X2), agent 1 will be the next
to select her most preferred item from {1, 2}. Agent 1 will
select item 2 since its value is 0. But this does not affect the
value of si − Vi(Xi), i = 1, 2, and then agent 1 has to con-
tinue to select an item, and only item 1 remains unselected.
Thus agent 1 will eventually get item 1. However, it is easy
to observe that X ′1 = {2} and X
′
2 = {1, 3, 4} is an WMMS
allocation as WMMS1 = −ǫ, WMMS2 = −1 + ǫ. Then the
algorithm is arbitrarily bad to agent 1.
B EgalGreedy Does not Work for General Case
Readers may suspect that algorithm EgalGreedy has a good
performance in the general setting, if Steps 4 and 5 are re-
placed by finding
i∗ = argmax
i∈N
Vi(Xi ∪ {j})
si
and Xi∗ = Xi∗ ∪ {j}. Unfortunately, in the following ex-
ample, we will see this is not true. Note that Step 2 is invalid
since the agents may not have same order of values, thus this
step has to be skipped. In the following we consider the case
when valuations are all normalized to −1. (Indeed, if the
agents’ valuations are not normalized to −1, it is easy to see
that EgalGreedy is arbitrarily bad.)
Let T > c > 1 be any two constant numbers and n be a
sufficiently large number such that 1
c
+ n−1
T
= 1. Let k =
T
√
2
c
. Consider the valuation functions shown in Table 6.
Chores
Agent Share 1 2 · · · k k + 1 · · · n− 1 n
1 1
c
− 1
T
− 1
T
· · · − 1
T
− 1
T
· · · − 1
T
− 1
c
2 1
T
− c
T 2
− 2c
T 2
· · · − kc
T 2
0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
n 1
T
− c
T 2
− 2c
T 2
· · · − kc
T 2
0 · · · 0 0
Table 6: Algorithm EgalGreedy performs badly when each agent has different valuations.
By the selection of k, each agent’s value for the grand bun-
dle goes to −1, thus the example is well-defined. Note that
for any j ≤ k,
V1([1 : j]) =
j
T
, and
V1([1 : j])
s1
= −
jc
T
,
Vi({j}) =
jc
T 2
, and
Vi({j})
si
= −
jc
T
.
Thus in the first k rounds of the algorithm, all the chores are
allocated to agent 1. Note that we can add some ǫ to break tie
by allocating the chore to the agent with larger share. Even-
tually, [1 : k] ⊆ X1 and V1(X1) ≤ −
k
T
≈ −
√
2
c
. However,
it is not hard to see that WMMS1 = −
1
c
. Thus Algorithm
EgalGreedy is arbitrarily bad for this example.
C Omitted Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof: Indeed, when all agents have identical valuation, the
chore allocation problem has a similar setting with schedul-
ing on uniform processors, where each processor may have a
different speed [Gonzalez et al., 1977; Friesen, 1987]. Recall
that Fi(I) is defined as
Fi(I) = min
〈X1,X2,...,Xn〉∈Π(M)
max
j∈N
D(Xj)
sj
,
whereD = −V . As all agents have the same value of Fi(I),
we denote this value to be F(I).
To reduce our problem to scheduling on uniform proces-
sors, let every agent i ∈ N be a processor with a speed of si.
Let every chore j ∈ M be a job, and Dj be the size of job j.
Thus,
Dj
si
is j’s processing time if it is processed on i. Then
F(I) can be described as finding a schedule to assign every
job to a processor such that the makespan of all processors is
minimized. Therefore, the computation of F(I) becomes the
computation of the minimummakespan of the corresponding
scheduling problem.
It is shown in [Gonzalez et al., 1977] that Algorithm
EgalGreedy returns a schedule whose makespan F′ is at most
twice of the optimal schedule’s makespan F(I), i.e., F′ ≤
2F(I). Let X = 〈X1, X2, . . . , Xn〉 be the allocation from
EgalGreedy. Thus for any agent i ∈ N ,
D(Xi)
si
≤ F′ ≤ 2F(I) ⇒ D(Xi) ≤ 2siF(I) = −2WMMSi(I).
That is V (Xi) ≥ 2WMMSi(I), which completes the
proof. 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof: Let (α∗,x) be an optimal solution of IP . Since
x is an integer solution, for any xij = 1, it must be that
Vij ≥ α∗WMMSi(I) as Vij ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ M .
Otherwise, Vij < α
∗WMMSi(I) implies
∑
j∈M Vijxij <
α∗WMMSi(I), which is a contradiction to that fact that
(α∗,x) is a feasible solution of IP . Thus, x must also be
a feasible solution of P when ti = wi = α∗WMMSi(I) for
all i ∈ N , which means α∗ ≥ c∗. 
C.3 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof: This is because any xij with Vij < ti is set to
be 0. 
